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*By Emmanuel Guerisoli. 
‘It is a lesson which all history teaches wise men, to put trust in ideas, 
and not in circumstances’. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
‘It is precisely in times of national emergencies that civil liberties must 
be defended and protected most forcefully. If not, then governments will 
be given incentives to constantly create crises, or perceptions of crises, 
and declaring “official states of emergency” in order to grab more and 
more power and money and destroy more and more liberty and 
prosperity’. 
United States Supreme Court  
(Ex Parte Milligan. 1866) 
 
Introduction 
Since the September 11 attacks, the notion of state of exception has been 
used in order to coin the legal and political repercussions of the ‘War on 
Terror’. These, by being labeled within the state of emergency’s legal -or 
extralegal- framework, have been able to be constitutionally justified and, 
also, ethically criticized. Proponents of draconian measures consider that, 
in certain circumstances, necessity dictates policies aimed at protecting 
the State from terrorist attacks. They deem terrorism an imminent and 
serious threat capable of destroying the institutions that give political 
cohesion to society. Denying, suspending and limiting certain individual 
rights amount to a lesser evil; compared to the, apparently, almost 
certain greater evil that terrorists embody. On the other hand, advocates 
of the inviolability of the rule of law believe that under any situation a 
democratic government should allow urgency and peril prevail over the 
constitutionally recognized political and human rights. For them, 
counterterrorism should not rely on extralegal actions ‘legitimized’ by the 
state of exception. The State already has the legal and adequate tools, 
provided by the police and criminal justice, to persecute terrorists. 
Democracies that recur to lesser evil arguments to fight terrorism always 
end up committing more damage that the one they were trying to prevent. 
This essay will analyze the state of exception by studying the legal and the 
political-social natures of it. Various arguments, in favor and against the 
exception, will be showcased by continuously referring to the War on 
Terror and its effects on the legal system and democracy. Lastly, a 
conclusion will address the importance of this debate in current politics 
and society.  
The State of Exception 
The state of exception or emergency can be studied under two different 
kinds of views: the legal and the political-social ones. The former defines 
the state of emergency, within the various constitutional frameworks of 
current modern democracies, as a temporary measure that limits or 
suspends certain individual freedoms within the territory of the State . It 
is prompted by a critical and imminent, domestic or foreign, threat to the 
State’s existence. Under this scenario, necessity overcomes the ‘normal’ 
rule of law. Consequentially, individual freedoms are limited while police, 
security and military agencies’ powers are enhanced. The debate 
regarding the state of exception’s legal aspect circles around the 
constitutionality of its enactment, the variety of faculties attributed to the 
State’s security forces and, more importantly, the personal rights 
suspension’s lawfulness. Politically and socially, the state of emergency is 
conceived either as the pivotal attribute that defines the sovereign body as 
such; or, either as the transitional step required for -‘legitimately’- 
transforming a democracy into a dictatorship. The former perception 
links the state of exception with the concept of sovereigntyunderstood as 
the State’s existence as an organized polity . The latter one considers any 
type of restriction to individual freedoms as a permanent damage to the 
fabrics of democracy .   
The Legal Nature of the State of Exception 
             
The legal, and political, origin of the state of emergency is to be found in 
ancient Roman law. According to the lex de dictatore creando, whenever 
the Roman Republic was in grave danger, the Senate designated an 
extraordinary magistrate that was invested with absolute and total 
authority over the Republic . Subsequently, a provisional dictatorship was 
instituted that lasted for six months or until the threat passed. The 
republican and the dictatorship authorities, to the Romans, were 
complementary; quite the opposite of how democracies and authoritarian 
regimes are understood today. However, Roman dictators quickly learned 
how to indefinitely prolong their authority by perpetuating foreign wars 
through the creation of an Empire. 
The institution of the Roman provisional dictatorship is the historical 
legal inception of the various types of state of emergency that are 
currently present within modern constitutions. Broadly speaking, in every 
constitution the state of exception is declared by the head of the executive 
power whenever the normal functions of the State’s institutions are no 
longer guaranteed because of foreign attack or domestic unrest. 
Fundamental liberties and rights -such as habeas corpus, freedom of 
movement and public gathering among others- are suspended or severely 
restricted. In most cases, the executive is entitled to order the arrest of 
individuals and to set military commissions for their trials. The security 
forces’ faculties are enhanced and the military is allowed to take on police 
activities. Depending on the country, the state of emergency could be 
declared to last for days, months or years and it can even be extended 
indefinitely number of times .   
The debate concerning the state of exception’s legal aspect comprises 
three main issues: its constitutionality; the amount of power given 
to the security forces; and, the limits set on fundamental 
freedoms, individual rights and constitutional guarantees. The 
state of emergency’s constitutional validity considers under which cases it 
can be declared.  As stated before, it is necessity that calls for the 
establishment of exception. It is necessary to give to the executive branch 
of government extraordinary powers and authority in order to prevent the 
State’s breakdown from an imminent and grave danger. This peril can be 
prompted by a domestic or foreign threat. The latter are not sufficiently, 
and narrowly, defined by modern constitutions. Normally, they invoke a 
military invasion by a foreign country or an internal insurrection; but 
both of them are broad cases and can be loosely interpreted. Taking the 
U.S. Constitution, for example, the state of emergency is only referred to 
in Article I, Section 9 where it states: ‘The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.’Therefore, only in the cases of 
rebellion –domestic threat- and invasion –foreign threat- the state of 
exception can be enacted. Regrettably, the Constitution does not define 
what constitutes a rebellion or an invasion. The task was left for legal 
experts and the Judiciary to tackle; but, it has not been easy or even 
coherent. 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to take on the constitutionality of 
the state of emergency after President Lincoln had declared it in 1861 . 
In Ex Parte Milligan, it was decided that the suspension of the habeas 
corpus and the setting of military tribunals for citizens was 
unconstitutional because, even if a rebellion was in course, civilian courts 
were still operating. Additionally, the Supreme Court went even further 
by declaring that the theory of necessity, which justifies the state of 
exception, was false. It was argued that under the rule of law, guaranteed 
by the Constitution, the powers needed to protect the State’s institutions 
are already set in place. Lastly, the Justices regarded the state of 
exception as a dangerous instrument that could only lead to despotism . 
Nevertheless, the Court did not pronounce itself about the issue of 
defining what constitutes a rebellion or invasion. Interestingly, even if it 
was deemed –correctly- that necessity never justifies the suspension of 
the rule of law, by not defining what constitutes an emergency, the Court 
considered the issue a political, and not a legal, matter . Rebellion and 
invasion remain broad, undefined, cases open to interpretation and to 
malleability by politics. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refrained 
itself from approaching the issue . 
The question of the security forces’ enhanced powers, during the state of 
emergency, is a thornier one when compared to the former. Moreover, it 
is also deeply intertwined with the problem regarding limitations to 
fundamental liberties. During the state of exception the police and other 
security agencies are given extraordinary faculties aimed at facilitating 
the expedient resolution of the crisis. Therefore, they are allowed to 
search within premises without warrants, to arrest suspects without a 
court order, to hold individuals for a long period of time with no access to 
a lawyer or judge, to carry out aggressive interrogations, to set up 
wiretapping and close surveillance with no Judiciary control. 
Furthermore, it could also be the case that intelligence agencies and the 
military would be empowered to perform police and judicial activities. 
Since the declaration of the state of emergency by President George W. 
Bush, following 9/11, numerous enhanced and new attributes have been 
granted to the United States’ security forces and agencies. Their faculties 
were augmented by several executive decrees and the three Patriot Acts. 
These pieces of legislation were said to be justified by the imminent and 
severe danger that terrorism embodied. But, are these prerogatives really 
needed to prevent future terrorist attacks? This is, of course, an endless 
debate; and one that again points out to the relationship between law and 
politics. As implied by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan, terrorists 
can be persecuted without declaring the state of emergency, by applying 
‘plain’ criminal law and by letting the F.B.I -not the military- take the 
lead. To sum up, the ‘normal’ rule of law is perfectly suited for the task. 
However, depending on how terrorism is considered, as a war act or as a 
criminal one, is still a political issue. 
Just like in both the question of the constitutionality of the state of 
exception and the empowerment of security agencies, the concern 
regarding the suspension or restriction of fundamental liberties is one 
that is ascribed within the lesser evil debate. Legally, the selection 
between continuing the ‘normal’ rule of law or enacting the state of 
exception weights the possible damage that not acting would cause 
against the harm that limiting individual freedoms would produce . It is 
here where the legal concept of necessity comes into play. It is necessary 
to inflict or withstand a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil. This 
is the pragmatic view of constitutional freedoms: the risk of harming 
individual freedoms is a lesser one when compared to the possibility of 
not having any State that protects those liberties . The moral point of view 
argues that, by restricting constitutional freedoms, the State is causing an 
irreversible damage that may, quite possibly, be greater than the one that 
necessity is trying to avoid .  
When a state of exception is enacted the fundamental liberties that are suspended 
are, normally, the right to habeas corpus; freedom of movement; the right to 
public and private gathering; and the right to due process among others. The 
United States Government, during both the Bush and the Obama 
Administrations, restricted and suspended several individual freedoms and 
constitutionally guaranteed rights in order to effectively and speedily fight 
terrorism and avert further attacks. The rights to habeas corpus, to due process, 
to unnecessary cruel punishment and to trial by jury have been gravely and 
irreversibly hampered by the legalization of indefinite detention, targeted killing, 
aggressive interrogation and military tribunals respectively. In nearly all these 
cases, there is no chance of contradictory or revisionary procedures that would 
allow the dismissal of their establishment by proving their unfairness or 
unconstitutionality . The issue, maybe, is that they are not only unfair, but that 
they are unnecessary and cause permanent damage. Targeted killing and 
aggressive interrogation, which would be better labeled as targeted assassination 
and torture, are completely detrimental to the rule of law and set up dangerous 
precedents for the future. Since both measures have to be sanctioned, in each 
case, by the President and there is no possibility of revision, it could be argued 
that the executive is taking on the exclusive attributes of the other two branches 
of government. The check and balances system, designed to avoid despotic 
power, is totally disregarded in these cases . Here, the effects of necessity are 
clearly the greater evil. 
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